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Recent Developments 
Hyle v. Motor Vehicle Admin.: 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held in Hyle v. 
Motor Vehicle Admin., 
348 Md. 143, 702 A.2d 760 
(1997), that a motorist who has 
agreed to a breath test for 
alcohol concentration, but 
cannot be tested because a 
qualified technician is not 
available to administer the test, 
may not be required to submit 
to a blood test. The court ruled 
that the Motor Vehicle 
Administration may not suspend 
the license of a motorist under 
such circumstances. 
Police officers pulled over 
Matthew John Hyle on the 
morning of January 26, 1996 
after he was seen driving 
through a red light and crossing 
over double yellow lines. Hyle 
had alcohol on his breath and 
after questioning, he told officers 
that he had consumed a few 
drinks. Police officers 
subsequently administered a 
number of field sobriety tests, 
and because Hyle was unable to 
successfully complete a 
determinative test, he was 
arrested on suspicion of driving 
while intoxicated. Hyle was 
consequently taken to the 
Central District Police Station in 
Baltimore City. 
At the police station, Hyle 
was informed that if he either 
refused to take a test for alcohol 
concentration or if he was found 
to have an alcohol content level 
of 0.1 or more, his license could 
be suspended. Hyle agreed to a 
breath test; however, because 
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no qualified person was available 
to perform the test, Hyle was told 
that he would have to be taken 
to a hospital where he would be 
required to submit to a blood 
test. Hyle refused, and 
consequently, his license was 
suspended for three months 
pursuant to section 16-205 of the 
Transportation Article of the 
Annotated Code of Maryland, 
which provides for the automatic 
suspension of a motorist's 
license where a motorist refuses 
to take an alcohol concentration 
test. 
Following suspension of his 
driver's license, Hyle requested, 
and was granted, an 
administrative hearing. At the 
hearing, the administrative law 
judge affirmed the suspension of 
Hyle's license, reasoning that the 
absence of a technician to 
administer a breath test 
amounted to the unavailability of 
equipment. The ALJ further 
determined that Hyle's 
unwillingness to submit to a 
blood test was tantamount to a 
refusal to submit to an alcohol 
test under section 16-205.1 of 
the Transportation Article. 
Hyle appealed the decision to 
the Circuit Court for Worcester 
County where the ALJ's decision 
was affirmed. Hyle then 
appealed to the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland and certiorari was 
granted. 
The court began its opinion 
by examining Maryland statutory 
provisions concerning drunk 
driving. Hyle, 348 Md. at 146, 
702 A.2d at 761. The court 
noted that under section 16-
205.1 (a)(2) of the Transportation 
Article, a motorist who drives on 
property used by the public, and 
is stopped on suspicion of 
driving while intoxicated or under 
the influence of alcohol, is 
considered to have given implied 
consent to take an alcohol test. 
Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., 
Transp. II section 16-
205.1 (b)( 1 )(i)2.A. (Supp. 1997». 
As set forth in section 16-
205.1 (a)(1 )(iii) of the 
Transportation Article, one of two 
types of alcohol tests may be 
administered in such 
circumstances: the breath test or 
the blood test. Id. at 147, 702 
A.2d at 762. Both tests require 
the use of "equipment approved 
by the toxicologist" and, that they 
be administered only by a 
"qualified person". Id. (citing MD. 
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. 
sections 10-304(a) and (c),(Supp 
1997)(hereinafter "C&J"). 
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Maryland C&J section 10-
305(a) provides that the breath 
test is the test to be administered 
in all cases, with only three 
exceptions wherein the blood 
test may be administered. Id. 
The court recognized that a 
blood test may be given only 
when: (1) the defendant is 
unconscious or unable to refuse 
a test, (2) the defendant is 
injured and must be taken to a 
hospital, or, (3) breath-test 
equipment is not available. Id. 
The court focused on the final 
exception and set out to 
determine whether the word 
"equipment", as used in the 
Maryland statute, encompassed 
a qualified technician. Id. at 148, 
702 A.2d at 762. The court 
noted that "only if the equipment 
was unavailable, would Hyle's 
refusal to take a blood test have 
violated [Transportation section] 
16-205.1". Id. (emphasis 
added). 
In interpreting the meaning of 
the term "equipment", the court 
examined the actual intent of the 
legislature, and looked to the 
plain language of the statute. Id. 
In doing so, the court turned to 
the dictionary definition of the 
term "equipment": "the 
implements used in an operation 
or activity". Id. at 149, 702 A.2d 
at 762 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD 
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
(1986». The court determined 
that "the term equipment, on its 
face, would seem to encompass 
the apparatus or machine used 
to test for alcohol levels and not 
the qualified technician 
necessary to administer the test." 
Id. 
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Additionally, the court 
continued, construing the term 
"equipment" to include a 
technician would render other 
portions of the statutory scheme 
concerning drunk driving 
superfluous and redundant. Id. at 
149-50, 702 A.2d at 763. The 
court pOinted out that C&J 
section 10-304(a)(3) states that 
a qualified person is one who 
receives training in the use of 
equipment in a program 
approved by a toxicologist. Id. at 
149,702 A.2d at 763. Similarly, 
C&J section 1 0-304(b) sets forth 
that the equipment used for a 
breath test must be approved by 
a toxicologist. Id. Therefore, if a 
technician was included in the 
term "equipment," only one of 
the two statutes would be 
necessary. Id. at 150,702 A.2d 
at 763. 
Furthermore, the legislature 
illustrated its willingness to use 
the terms "equipment" and 
"qualified person" exclusively as 
evidenced by its distinct 
references to each in the 
pertinent statutes. Id. at 151, 
702 A.2d at 763. C&J sections 
10-304(b) and 1 0-304(c)(1 )(i), 
for example, state that "blood 
and breath tests must be 
administered by a 'qualified 
person' with 'equipment 
approved by the toxicologist'" Id. 
(emphasis added). The court 
finally looked to the legislative 
history of C&J section 10-305 
and determined that the 
legislature did not intend the 
term "equipment" to encompass 
a technician. Id. at 151, 702 
A.2d at 764. 
The court explained that the 
legislature, after balancing the 
advantages and disadvantages 
of blood and breath tests, 
resolved that breath tests would 
be the test administered in most 
cases. Id. at 151-56, 702 A.2d 
at 764-66. 
The court further determined 
that the legislature specified the 
test to be used in drunk-driving 
cases to prevent police officers 
from using their own discretion in 
deciding which test to administer. 
Id. at 151,156, 702 A.2d at 
764,66. The court opined that by 
including a qualified person to 
fall within the meaning of 
equipment, officers would 
essentially have discretion to 
choose which test to apply. Id. at 
156, 702 A.2d at 766. For 
example, police officers could 
schedule technicians to work 
,only certain hours, thereby 
making them available at their 
discretion, which the court noted, 
would be contrary to the 
legislature's intent. Id. 
This decision strictly adheres 
to the plain language and 
meaning of C&J section 10-305. 
The court, in reaching its 
deCiSion, carefully considered 
legislative history, and the 
common scheme of the 
Maryland statutes concerning 
drunk driving, maintaining the 
intent and spirit of the legislature. 
The court's findings further 
preserved and ensured the 
statute's intent to safeguard 
against discretionary police 
interference and protect "the 
integrity of an individual's 
person. 
